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NOTE AND COMMENT.
LIMITATION Or THz AmouIrT o THZ COMMON CARIR'S LUAEITY.-HZP-
BuRN Ac.-When the case of Railrad v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357,
settled the law that the common carrier can not contract against liability for
losses due to his negligence, it- did not put an end to the.efforts of common
ca.rriers to escape liability for losses so arising. See 8 MicE. I. Rev. 531.
Various stipulations were printed in bills of lading, among thm one provid-
ing that in case of loss the money recoverable should not exceed a specific
sum. In many early cases this was decided to be but a new way of escaping
the common law liability of the carrier for his negligence, -by getting out
of one half, or one-third, or some other fraction, of the liability which the
courts had said could not be escaped at all. * Thus in-Moulton v. St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 85, 47 Am. Rep. 78r, an agree-
ment that, in case of total loss, the damage should in no case exceed. $oo.oo
per head for horses, the court held to be contrary to public policy as reliev-
ing the carrier of liability for his own negligence. Horses worth $2oo.oo
each having been- shipped under such a contract and lost through the negli-
gence of the carrier, full recovery was allowed. The United States Supreme
Court,however, in Hart.v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 33x, held that an
agreed-valuation for the purpose of shipment of not more than $200oo each
on horses was valid, because it appeared that this valuation had furnished
the basis for the carrying charges. It was not only no exemption from liabil-
ity for negligence, but on the other hand to hold the carrier liable in a
greater sum would be fraud, and repugnant to the soundest principles of fair
dealing and of the principle of freedom of contract.
It is more than a quarter of a century since that decision, but there is not
yet aty sign of diminution in the volume of cases in which shippers continue
to contend against conditions resulting from that rule of law. The question
is a troublesome one. Fraud is often attempted upon'the carrier. If Persian
shawls and rugs and a diamond ring are shipped under a contract describ-
ing the goods as a second-hand desk, and providing against no extraordinary
liability, unless a special agreement is made and the value is endorsed there-
on, then certainly it is eritirely equitable to limit recovery to the value of a
second-hand desk. Hachadoorian v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., x28 App.
Div. 171, 112 ,.-Y. Supp. 66o. And if a shipper himself fills in a shipping
receipt limiting recovery to -fifty dollars unless the value is stated, and if the
carrier has no knowledge of the real value of the goods shipped, then it
seems reasonable to deny a higher recovery where a shipper did not fill in
the blank as to value. High Co. v. Adams Express Co., (Ga. App.), 63 S. ..
mII25. See also Douglass Co. v. Minnesota Transfer Co. (Minn.), 30 L. R. A.
86o. But a limitation of recovery to $5o.oo where the carrying charges
were $98.xo is pretty clearly not based upon any understanding that $50.oo
represents the real value. And the same thing is true in a case like Murphy
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 99 Minn. 23o, io8 N. W. o7o, in which strawberries
worth $2,ooo.oo were shipped at a charge of $330.oo and the carrier unsuccess-
fully attempted to limit the value for purposes of shipment to $5o.oo. See.
however, Baum, v. Long Island R. Co., io8 N. Y. Supp. 1113, in which the
goods were worth $1,192.88, but recovery was limited to $50.00, and Donlon
v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 6o3, 91 Pac. 6o3, ii L. R. A. (N. S.) 811, in
which the owner of valuable horses which had been shipped over defendant
railroad was limited to the recovery of the stipulated $20.00 for each horse.
Some -cases have gone very far to uphold, all such stipulations. Baum v.
Long Island R. Co.,- supra, Donlon v. Southern Pacific Co. supra. Some
have denied the operation of the rule almost in toto. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co. v. Oriental Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), ii S. W. 979; Southern Express
Co. v. Owens (Ala.), 41 South. 752. The widely divergent rules are fully
discussed in the-recent case of Hansen v. Great Northern Ry. Go. (N. D.),
121 N. W. 78, which -adopts a middle course, holding that a value in a bill of
lading, which is set without inquiry or investigation as to the'true value of
the property, is arbitrary, is not reasonable and just, and is therefore in-
valid.- It would seem from the general principles accepted by the courts that
the test as to the validity of provisions of this sort should be their reason-
ableness.' An actual bona fide valuation should be binding, but one that is
-arbitrarily fixed, or one that was evidently intended to excuse the carrier
from his real liability on the condition that he would charge the shipper a
less rate, should not. -If he and a shipper may agree that the-liability may
be less than the real value, there would seem to be no reason why they may
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not by their private agreement make it as much less as they please, or even
excuse the carrier altogether. This it is well settled, can not be done by a
contract assented to by an individual shipper. On .the other hand, if the
shipper attempts a fraud upon the carrier, or refuses to respond upon the
carrier's request for information, it is certainly just to fix limits on the
carrier's liability. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Butler Marble Co. (Ga.
App.), 68 S. E. 775. Compare Alair v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 53 Minn.
i6o, i9 L. R. A. 764, with Moulton v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R.
Co., 31 Minn. 85, 47 Am. Rep. 781, in which the Minnesota court harmonizes
its decisions upon this basis. In the Georgia case a general limitation as to
value -of twenty cents per cubic foot for monumental marble was held to be
clearly nothing more than an arbitrary adjustm.ent for the measure. of dam-
ages in case of loss, which could not exempt the carrier from liability for the
true value of a shipment lost by his negligence. If there were an issue of
fact as to whether the value fixed .was a bona fide valuation the question
would be one for the jury, but here the carrier knew what the goods -were
and the value fixed was manifestly inadequate. See also Southern Express
Co. v. Hanaw (Ga.), 67 S. R. 944, in which the Supreme Court of Georgia
refused to give effect to the New York rule on a shipment from New York,
because the express receipt limiting liability to.$5o.oo unless a definite value
was given, while it would be binding in New York, was conirary to public
policy in Georgia unless it appeared that $5o.oo was a bona fide valuation.
In Powers Mercantil Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 93 Minn. 143, ioo N. W.
753, the samd limitation in an express receipt was held not binding on a con-
signment known by the Express Co. to contain silk shirtwaists. The same
court in Ostroot v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (Minn.), 127 N. NV. 177, held
a shipper not bound by a stipulation limiting recovery for household goods
to five dollars per hundred-weight. "It should require no argument to show
that a valuation of five dollars per hundred-weight, when applied to pianos,
cooking utensils and household goods, is intended as a mere arbitrary limita-
tion of liability." But the same court. in Porteous v. Adams Express Co.,
(Minn.) ,27 N. W. 429, refused to allow a recovery of. more than $5o.o0 on a
shipment of a paste-board box, although the box contained jewelry to the value
of $I,43s.oo. It appeared that the carrier had no knowledge of the contents of
the box. The Utah court seems to make the same distinction, refusing to
recognize a limitation where the facts show that it is -unreasonable, but en-
forcing it in a case when goods worth $4o.oo per hundred-weight were
shipped as householrd goods at a limit of $5.oo per hundred-weig-ht, the goods
being described as "A roll of carpet including one feather bed." These goods
might, for all the carrier knew, be worth no more thari $5.oo per hundred-
weight Larsen v. Oregon Shortline R. Co., (Utah) iio Pac. 983.
t But several recent decisions have upheld these limitations without regard
to the distinctions in the last mentioned cases. The Michigan court, in
D'Arcy v. Adams Express Co., (Mich.) 127 N. W. 261, upheld an express
receipt limiting to $50.oo the value recoverable; though the goods shipped
were opals worth $372.00, and the carrier had notice and knowledge that the
pickage contained valuable opals. Bernard v. Adams Express Co., (Mass.)
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gr N. E. 325, was -a case in which the Massachusetts court without making
distinctions, -upheld. a similar contract, and cited with approval the recent
New York case of Greenwald v. Weir, i3o App. Div. 696, ii 5 N. Y. Supp..
311. This very late case has been several times cited by other courts, see
Travis v. Wells Fargo & Co., (N. J.), 74 Atl. 444; Larsen v. Oregon Short-
line R. Co., (Utah), nio Pac. 983, and it has now been approved by the court
of last resort in New York, Greenwald v. Barrett, (N. Y.), 92 N. E. 218.
See also In re Released Rates, 13 Int. State Com. Com. R. 55o.
The Hepburn Act, passed June 29, i9o6, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 5§, (U. S. Comp.
St Supp. igog, p. is66)-, has been held by some courts to put an end to con-
tract limitations as to value. Greenwald v. Weir, ii N. Y. -Supp. 235, (over-
ruled iti 115 N. Y. Supp. 311), Vigouroux v. Platte, x5 N. Y. Supp. 886, 62
Misc. 364. The act provides, P. 550, "that any common carrier, railroad or
transportation company, receiving property for transportation from a point
in one state to a point in another state, shall issue a receipt or bill of lading
therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, dam-
age, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, rail-
road-or transportation company to which such property may be transferred,
or over whose line or lines such property may pass; and no contract, receipt?
rule or regulation shall exempt such common cairier, railroad, or transpor-
tation company from the liability hereby impose'l; provided that nothing in
this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading, of any
remedy or right of action which he has under existing law."
The result of the opinions rendered thus far indicates that-the statute will
make no change in the effect of such contracts, except that it will fasten
upon the carrier liability for the defaults of connecting carriers as well as
, for its own negligence. It has yet to be passed upon by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The various states are likely to hold to their former
* positions. See Larsen v. Oregon Shortline R. Co. (Utah), nio Pac. 983;
Southern Express Co. v. Hanaw, (Ga.) 67 S. .. 944; Greenwaid v. Barrett,
(N. Y1.) 92 N. X. 2x8; Travis v. Wells, Fargo & Co- (N. J.) 74 AUt. 444;
Bernard v. Adatm Express Co. (Mass.) 91 N. E_ 325..
An interesting turn is taken in Schlosser v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (N.
DL) 127 N. W. 5o2. It is there held- that if one person is.*bound to ship
goods to- another the carrier becomes'the agent of the consignor. - If by the
negligence of the carriei the goods art lost, then the consignee may sue
either the consignor- or the carrier,, not on the Contract of shipment, but on
the liability of both 'principal and agent, or of 6ither aldne, for the torts'of
the agent. If this is gbod law, why may not a shipping public devise a con-
tract whereby a consignor einployi the-carribr as his-agent, so that the con-
signee may recover in tort against the carrier for any loss due to the negli-
gence of the latter, and that he shall not be bound by the contract between
the consignor' and the carrier? The end of this struggle between the carrier
and the people is 'not yet. It may be that further statutes' are to be required
to secure quiet on this troubled water. In this connection the language used
by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Matter of Released Rates, 13
Int. State Com. Com. L 565, is very suggestive. "But we should not hesitate
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to; express our 'isapproval. of tariff. rules that are ambigious and misleading,
:nd- to A certain extent incapable of enforcement. Rule 4 of the Western
Classification, -quoted above, would be unobjectionable if it went no further
than to'absolve the carrier from liability for loss due to causes beyond its
-control. The carier could not, however, escape responsibility for losses due
to many- of the causes catalogueid therein if, its negligence were the legal
cause of the damage. The carrier must know, too, that the courts will not
give full effect to stipulations'that 'tlre shall be no. liability for losses 'from
any cause. to property: carried ori open cars.' -Again, the stipulation that
'shipments, not'made as above provided are. subject to an additional charge
of zo per- cent' is 'unreasonable. A certain differential between rates which
leave thi carrier's liability unlimited- and rates which provide for a limited
liability is. obviously proper, but tlie differential -should exactly measure the
additional insurance risk -which the carrier assumes -when the liability is
unlimited. An' increased charge of 2o per cent is manifestly out of all pro-
portion to -the larger risk iivolved; and its 'virtual, effect is to restrict the
public to rates calling fozimited liability. *Herein lies th vice in stipulations
.of this character. it is a mischievous practice for carriers to publish in their
tariffs and on their bills of liding rules .and regulations which are misleading,
unreasonable, or'incapable of literal enforcement in a court of law. A re-
vision, in the 'iterest of simplicity and fairness, eliminating such provisions
as may be open to'legal objection, would go a 16ng way toward improving the
relation of the railroads and the shipping public." X. C. G.
